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Summary  findings
Building reliable institutions that support a market  indicators can explain differences in economic
system is widely believed to be critical to a successful  performance.
economic transition.  The results suggest that the predictability of the
Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder present indicators on  institutional framework may indeed explain a large part
the predictability of the institutional framework across  of differences in foreign direct investment and in
twenty transition economies - including indicators of  economic growth among transition  economies. Political
the predictability of rules, political stability, the security  stability and secure property rights are particularly
of property rights, the reliability of the judiciary, and the  important to entrepreneurial  confidence in the economy.
lack  of corruption.  They  then  investigate  whether  these
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One of the crucial preconditions for economic transition is to build institutions that
support a market system.  Such institutions range from bankruptcy laws to regulations on insider
trading to rules defining property and contract rights.  New laws and regulations should be
enacted quickly along with the establishment of enforcement agencies.  It is not an easy task to
put into place the rules that create a level playing field and a predictable institutional framework
for market development.  In fact, evidence in this paper suggests that all transition economies
still have a long way to go in building such institutions.  However, there are substantial
differences in the relative success in building institutions in various transition economies.
Furthermore we provide some indication that differences in successfully building a reliable
institutional framework (as perceived by the private sector of the respective country) may
contribute to explain relative economic performance.
The paper is based on new survey data on the institutional framework of 20 transition
countries. The data was collected during a global  private sector survey project done for the
World Bank in preparation of the World Development Report 1997. The most relevant data for
transition economies is first presented region by region and in a second step we analyze the
relation of various indicators derived from the data set and economic performance.
The premise of the WDR survey was to obtain, to compare, and to quantify private firms'
perceptions on the reliability of regulations, policies, and laws.  To this end we designed a
multiple choice questionnaire to capture cross-country differences of the reliability of the
2institutional framework. 2 The survey covers a stratified sample of entrepreneurs in Africa, the
Americas, Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union), Eastern
Europe, Western Europe, and the Middle East. The overall survey results appear in Brunetti,
Kisunko and Weder (1997a), and growth and investment regressions for the whole survey sample
are discussed in Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1  997b).  Both of these papers are companion
pieces to this paper.
This paper represents the first step in the direction toward a more detailed analysis for one
specific region.  Transition economies were chosen for several reasons.  First, the data set is quite
comprehensive covering 20 formerly planned economies including most of the ,,large"
countries-all  in various stages of transition.  Second, the transition process itself produces
institutional uncertainties that impede private business development.  Measurement of the
minimization and/or quick elimination of these institutional uncertainties could potentially
provide evidence of a successful recovery.  Third, correlating institutional measures to
macroeconomic data presents a special challenge in the case of transition countries where there
tends to be wide ranges of data reliability-even  in the last few years.  This proved to be a
problem in the econometric analysis for the whole sample where data of very different quality
was to be mixed together. 3 This leads to the natural conclusion that the transition economies
should be analyzed separately from all the other surveyed regions.
The paper is divided into two parts.  Part I presents descriptive statistics for all major
questions for each of the six geographical sub-regions of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth
of Independent States. The six geographical sub-regions are considered individually in five
major categories of institutional reliability.  Part II uses one representative indicator from each of
these five categories as well as an overall indicator of credibility introduced in Brunetti, Kisunko
and Weder (1997b) and analyzes their relationship to cross-country differences in economic
performance. The hypothesis we are testing is that higher institutional reliability, regardless of
the specific measure, is good for economic performance. As a measure of economic performance
2  The questionnaire  together  with  region  by region results  is displayed  in  the appendix.
3  See  Brunetti,  Kisunko  and Weder  (1997b).
3we work with the standard per capita growth rate.  In addition we use an indirect indicator of
differences in performance-foreign  direct investment as a percentage of GDP-which  is
probably a more reliable measure for cross-country analysis in transition economies.
4I.  Descriptive Statistics: Region by Region Results
We inspect five categories of institutional reliability-{i)  predictability of rules, (ii)
political stability (lack of uncertainty stemming from government changes), (iii) property rights
security, (iv) judiciary reliability, and (v) lack of corruption.  In the questionnaire respondents
were asked to answer questions using a range from 1 (the business environment is completely
reliable) to 6 (the environment is completely unreliable).  Results are presented as percentages of
surveyed businesses who ticked the three worst options.  This share is calculated for each
country, and then a regional value is calculated by taking the simple average.
The graphs present the responses for six geographical regions:
Baltics:  Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
Balkan:  Albania, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia.
Caucasus  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia.
Central Asia  Kazakstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan.
Slavic and Moldova  Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine.
Visegrad  Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic.
I.  Predictability of rules
The first dimension of the reliability of an institutional framework focuses on the
lawmaking process.  The questions in this section inquire whether new laws and policies come as
a surprise, whether private firms are informed of changes in advance, or if their concerns can be
raised during the lawmaking process.  The questionnaire was designed to capture this important
dimension of institutional reliability by approaching it from different angles.  The closing
question in this section asks whether entrepreneurs fear retroactive changes in the government
policies.
5Given the situation of recently convened, inexperienced legislative bodies in transition
countries, this dimension of uncertainty is probably the most unavoidable during the process of
transition.  After all, such a large structural change is quite unique, mistakes and trial and error
are unavoidable.  Predictability, therefore, was not expected to be high.  But what is interesting
is that there are differences in the perceptions of entrepreneurs in different countries.  The
transition process seems to have been more predictable in some countries than in others.
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
1.  Policy surprises  90
(question  1 in the survey  80 }
questionnaire).  This  70
question addresses the  60
problem of predictability  50  *
from the most general  40
perspective asking about  30
problems with unexpected  20
changes in rules, laws and  10
policies.  0  _E
Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic &
Asia  Moldova
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
2.  Lack of Credibility of  80
announcements  (question  70
2 in the survey  60
questionnaire). In this  50
question entrepreneurs were
asked  whether  they  thought  40
that the government would  30
stick to major announced  20
policies.  °*
0  -
Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic  &
Asia  Moldova
6Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
3.  Retroactive changes  90
(question 5 in the survey  80
questionnaire).  One cause  70
of an unpredictable  60
business environrment  can  50
be retroactive changes of  40
policies and regulations.  30
This question addresses this  20
issue.  10U_  _
0
Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic  &
Asia  Moldova
The three charts above show that about 80 percent of entrepreneurs in the Slavic countries
and Moldova feel exposed to uncertainty of rules, laws and policies.  The entrepreneurs do not
believe announcements and do fear retroactive changes might affect their business operations.
The situation in the Central Asian region is only slightly better.  Policy surprises and changes in
the announced policies are considered the least problematic in the Balkan countries and in the
Caucasus republics.  Entrepreneurs from Visegrad countries have the least fear of retroactive
changes.
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
4. Lack of Information  90
(question 3 in the survey  80
questionnaire).  70
Entrepreneurs were asked  60
whether they were usually  50
informed about rules and  40




Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Cucasus  Central  Slavic  &
Asia  Moldova
7Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
5.  Lack of Participation  100  -
(question 4 in the survey  90
questionnaire).  This  80 ±
question is closely linked to  70
the previous one.  Problems  60  -.
with changes in rules and  40 I*
regulations is less likely if  30
the entrepreneurs who might  20 1
be affected could participate  10  l
in the process of rule  o X
making.  Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic  &
Asia  Moldova
Lack of information during the lawmaking process and lack of participation by
entrepreneurs as well as the lack of government consideration of their concerns are large
problems in all regions.  70 and 85 percent of entrepreneurs respectively in Balkan and Baltic
countries felt unsatisfied.  Participation results were even worse.  90 percent of entrepreneurs in
four of six regions (Baltics, Central Asia, Moldova, and Visegrad) felt that their concerns were
not taken into account during the process changing important laws and policies.  An only slightly
lower dissatisfaction level was reported in the Caucasus states (78 percent ) and in the Balkan
countries (80 percent).
Overall, it appears that unpredictable rule changes are an important problem for the
entrepreneurs in transition economies.  What can also be derived is that businesses want a more
significant role in rulemaking.  The overall dissatisfaction of transition economy respondents
with the possibilities of participation was the highest among all regions surveyed.
On a more positive note predictability results from some more advanced transition
economies indicate a better situation.  For instance, in the Visegrad countries, the fear of
retroactive changes is relatively low-only  about 38 percent of respondents reported such a fear.
This is comparable to the levels in East and Southeast Asian countries (see Brunetti, Kisunko,
Weder, 1997a).
8II.  Political Stability
The second dimension of institutional reliability concentrates on government changes.
The empirical literature suggests that different measures of government stability can be related to
economic performance.  The questionnaire goes one step further by directly asking the firms
whether it fears that government changes are accompanied by institutional uncertainties.  Two
questions address this issue and distinguish between regular government changes through
elections and irregular government changes, i.e.  coups.
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
1. Policy surprises due to  so
constitutional changes of  70
government (question 7 in  60
the survey questionnaire).  50
This question asks
entrepreneurs whether  40
regular changes in  30
government are usually  20
accompanied by large  10
changes in rules and  0  _
regulations that impact their  Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic &
business.  Asia  Moldova
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
2.  Policy surprises due to
irregular government  so
changes (question 8 in the  70
survey questionnaire).  The  60
aim of this question is to  50
evaluate the uncertainty  40
entrepreneurs fear due to the  30
possibility of possible  n0
irregular (unconstitutional)  20
government changes.  10
0  L  I
Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic &
Asia  Moldova
9Concerns about the negative impact of constitutional changes in government are high in
all regions.  The lowest percentage of entrepreneurs who see this as a problem for their business
operations is reported in the Visegrad countries (66 percent) followed by Balkan states. 78
percent of entrepreneurs in the Caucasus region feel their business will be impacted by a
constitutional change in government.
Fears of unconstitutional changes in government vary greatly across regions: from 20
percent in Visegrad countries to 74 percent in Slavic countries of the FSU and Moldova.  In the
Balkans, the Central Asian and the Caucasus countries over 60 percent of the entrepreneurs
recorded such a fear.
High overall uncertainty about regular changes in government might be explained
through the polarized political spectrum in transitional countries.  Recorded fears were lowest in
the Visegrad countries, where, by the time of the survey, several free democratic elections had
produced significant changes in the party structures of governments but had not led to drastic
changes in the economic course.  Following this logic the poor performance of the Caucasus
region and relatively favorable performance of Slavic states and Moldova might be understood.
The relatively good performance of the Balkan region and the relatively poor performance of
Baltic states defy performance expectations set up by this logic.
It seems that in countries where the state is viewed as more stable and the balance of
power between different political groups is established, fears of unconstitutional changes of
government are lower.  These factors distinguish the Visegrad countries and the Baltics from the
rest of the regions .
III.  Property rights security
10The third dimension of the reliability in the institutional framework focuses on security of
property and contract rights.  In contrast to the predictability of rules and political stability, this
dimension and the next two concentrate on law enforcement not the lawmaking process.  We
inquire whether firms can rely on a clear and predictable enforcement of these rules.  Two
questions in this section check whether firms perceive criminal action as a major problem, and
more directly, whether they rely on state authorities to protect them.
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
1.  Theft and crime  100T
(question 9 in the  90
survey questionnaire).  80
This question deals  70
with how serious the  60 50
entrepreneurs in the  40
regions view theft and  30
crime as a source of  20
additional cost imposed  lo
on their business  0
operations.  Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic &
Asia  Moldova
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
2. Insecurity  ofproperty  90
and lack ofpersonal safety  80  _
(question 10 in the survey  70 T
questionnaire).  This  60  -
question asks whether  50
entrepreneurs trust the  40
government to protect their  30 ±
property and person against  20
criminal actions.  10
0  -
Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic  &
Asia  Moldova
Roughly 70 percent of entrepreneurs in the Visegrad countries reported that crime and
theft imposed additional cost.  More dramatically 90 percent of respondents in the Slavic
11countries  and Moldova  as well as those surveyed  in Central  Asian countries  find  that crime  and
theft substantially  increased  their cost of doing  business. About  80 percent of entrepreneurs  in
the Baltic states and in the Caucasus  voiced  this complaint.
Across  regions,  the confidence  of business  people about  government's  ability to provide
property  and personal  protection  differs  little. Compared  to other  regions entrepreneurs  in the
Caucasus  feel  the "safest"-70  percent  report that they  are not confident  that state authorities
will protect  them and  their property. Overall,  the responses  for these transition  economies  show
that the state fails  to provide  this basic  public service  of protection  to the local population.
IV.  Judiciary reliability
This category concerns the predictability of the judiciary and whether lack of such
predictability  represents  a major problem  for doing  business. Unreliable  judiciaries can cause
two types  of uncertainty-lack of fair recourse  against  unlawful  behavior  and incentives  to
substitute  the formal  law by private means  of conflict  settlement. The latter can force citizens
and businesses into a vicious cycle of lawlessness.
Percentage  of firms  that consider  this a problem
1.  Unreliability ofjudiciary
(question 11 in the survey  90
questionnaire).  The question  80
asked if unpredictability of the  70
judiciary presented a major  60






Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic &
Asia  Moldova
In the countries of Central Asia almost 90 percent of firms felt that an unpredictable
judicial system  imposed  costs on their business. About 80 percent  of firns in the Slavic
12countries of the FSU and Moldova responded similarly. Responses of entrepreneurs in Baltic,
the Caucasus, and Visegrad countries on this topic ranged between 60 and 70 percent.
V.  Corruption
The extent and the nature of corruption is the fifth dimension of institutional reliability.
A high level of corruption is a sign of large bureaucratic discretion and is, therefore, likely to be
related to institutional uncertainties.  Three questions are asked in this category.  The first
question focuses on the simple extent of corrupt practices while the other two questions inquire
whether the bribe amount is known in advance and whether the bribe guarantees delivery of the
service. 4 Corruption would thus be rendered a transaction cost with effects similar to a tax rather
than creating genuine uncertainties on the institutional framework.
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
70
1. Frequency of corruption  60
(question 14 in the survey  50
questionnaire).  This
question deals with the issue  40
of corruption in the most  30
broad perspective without  20
distinguishing between petite
and large scale bribes, its  10
intention and result.  0_
Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic &
Asia  Moldova
in  iWe  do not present  results  for question 15 in the questionnaire  because  answers  cannot  be interpreted  in
staigthforward  way.
13Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
2.  Corruption and  60
blackmailing  (question 16 in
the survey questionnaire).  50
This question tried to access  40
the degree to which corruption
is organized in a country. It  30
asked whether entrepreneurs  20
felt confident that they would
not be blackmailed by other  10
officials if they paid a bribe.  _
Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic  &
Asia  Moldova
Percentage of firms that consider this a problem
3.  Uncertainty about  30
receiving a service after  T
paying a bribe (question 17 in  25 +
the survey questionnaire).  20
This question attempted to
determine the uncertainty of  15
the outcome of corruption  10
from a different angle.  It asks
if paying a bribe guarantees
receiving  the promised  0 I
services.  Visegrad  Baltics  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic  &
Asia  Moldova
The two regions where entrepreneurs reported the lowest frequency of "additional
payments" were Visegrad and the Baltic countries-only  about 40 percent of respondents made
these additional payments more than "sometimes."  This result is about ten percentage points
higher than in South and Southeast Asia (see Brunetti, Kisunko, Weder, 1997a).  In another
comparison this result is much better than that of the Caucasus region where the regional average
was 69 percent.  Other transition economy results are as follows: the Balkans (57 percent),
Central Asia (66 percent), and Slavic republics of the FSU and Moldova (59 percent).
14The fear of being forced to pay multiple bribes to different bureaucrats for the same
service was lowest in Visegrad and Baltic countries-24  percent on average in each of these
regions.  These regions are followed-by  a large gap-by  the Slavic and Moldova region (44
percent),  Balkan countries (47 percent), and Central Asia and Caucasus where about 50 percent
of entrepreneurs expressed a fear to be forced to pay more than once.
Finally, entrepreneurs expressed relatively low doubts that service they paid bribes for
would not be delivered as agreed.  Around 20 percent of surveyed entrepreneurs in the Visegrad
and the Baltic states, Central Asia and the Caucasus answered in this sense. The percentage was
only slightly higher in the Slavic states and Moldova and in Balkan countries.
II.  Effects on economic performance
The effects of institutional uncertainty on economic performance in transition countries
are analyzed using the categories presented in the previous part. After discussing the empirical
approach we present results of institutional uncertainty indicators in regressions for foreign direct
investment and for growth.
1.  Empirical Strategy
Our aim is to test the effects of institutional uncertainty as it relates to predictability of
rules, political stability, property rights security, judiciary reliability and lack of corruption.  We
choose a single representative question from each category of institutional uncertainty and test it
against foreign direct investment and growth.  Additionally we test an average indicator that is
composed of several questions and can be interpreted as an overall indicator of the credibility of
rules. 5 The results of the indicators from the remaining questions presented in the descriptive
part are confined to appendix 4.
5  In Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997b) we test this overall indicator on growth and investment in a larger
sample of countries.
15Indicators  of institutional  uncertainty  are constructed  by calculating  simple  averages  of
the responses. The questions  were all multiple choice  with answers  ranging  from 1 to 6. All
indicators  are constructed  in such  a manner  that 6 is the best choice  (least uncertainty)  and 1 the
worst (most  uncertainty). Consequently  we expect  a positive  relationship  with both FDI and
growth. Every section  included  questions  about  conditions  5 year ago and these are used to
construct  earlier  values of the indicator. The average  of the earlier  and the present  indicator  is
used in the regression  analysis  as an average  for the period  from 1990  to 1995.
We test the following  specific  indicators  derived  from the questionnaire:
Predictability  of rules:  question  no.  1
Political  stability:  question  no. 8
Property  rights security:  question  no. 9
Reliability  of the judiciary:  question  no. 11
Lack of corruption:  question  no. 14
Credibility:  questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 146
The dependent  variables  are either  FDI inflows  as a share  of GDP or average  growth  rate
of GDP. We analyze  foreign  direct  investment  because  this is likely  to be among  the most
reliable  data available  for transition  economies  and can also be interpreted  as an overall indicator
of economic  performance.  We also conduct  standard  growth  analysis. The period for both
endogenous  variables  is an average  of three years, 1993-1995.  This time period was selected  in
order  to avoid  the most severe  initial shocks  that the transition  process  involved.
We use the same specifications  in all the foreign  direct  investment  and growth
regressions. First we test the indicator  alone,  then include  other  economic  variables  as controls.
Because  of the small sample  size we cannot  control  simultaneously  for many  additional  factors,
6  The indicator  is constructed  in the same manner  as in Brunetti,  Kisunko and Weder  (1997b), i.e. taking an
average of the questions in the 5  categories.
16so that we include the controls one by one. 7 We control for GNP per capita in the initial year
(GNP92), 8 the secondary school enrollment rate in the initial year (school), the average degree of
openness to international trade (measured as the sum of export and import share in GDP
(openness), the average rate of government consumption (gov. cons.), and the average inflation
rate (inflation). All data are derived from the World Economic Indicators (World Bank 1997).
These control variables are standard in growth regressions 9:  The first two control for
differences in initial conditions and the latter three for differences in policies.  The rational for
including them in FDI regressions is the following: initial income per capita is an indicator of
how attractive the market is for the foreign investor; schooling is a measure of human capital,
therefore the higher this capital the more productive is as a prospective investment.  Openness,
inflation, and government consumption can be interpreted as proxies for policy distortions.
Market size-a  criterion often mentioned by multinational companies as influencing their
investment decision-is  taken into account indirectly because FDI is considered as a percent of
GDP.' 0
Endogeneity might be a problem in the growth regressions, especially because we are
studying transition economies."  The causality could be running from successful transition--
which would express itself in higher economic performance--to better institutions.  In an attempt
to mitigate this problem we use the average value of the indicator for 1990-1995, rather than the
actual value of 1995. Also, we run regressions using the indicator of political rights (Freedom
House 1994) as an instrument.  The rational for using political rights as an instrument for
institutional reliability is that (i) political rights are not correlated with growth (this has been
substantiated by a large number of empirical cross country studies on growth" 2) and (ii) political
7  The  maximum  sample  size is 18  countries. Macedonia  and Albania  had  to be excluded  because  in those
countries  the survey did not ask about the situation  5 years ago. Therefore,  we were unable  to calculate  average
values of the indicators  for these  two countries.
8  Using the World  Bank  ,,Atlas" Method  to calculate  the US $ equivalent
9  See  e.g. Barro  (1991)  or Levine  and  Renelt  (1992).
10  We also experimented  with the population  as a proxy for market  size  but the variable  proved  to be
insignificant.
"1  The causality  between  institutions  and FDI inflows  is not likely  to be problematic.
12  See for instance  Brunetti  and Weder  (1995) for a survey  of studies  on demoncracy  and growth.
17rights, i.e. the quality of the election process and more generally the degree of democratic control
are likely to be related with the reliability of the institutional framework. In general, mature
democracies will provide better protection of property rights, more political stability, and more
predictability.  In the full sample of 69 countries the correlation between the average credibility
indicator and political rights is 0.67,  in our sample of transition economies it is 0.70.
Of course, given that better causality tests cannot be performed and macro data is sparse
(and in the case of growth their quality is also doubtful), the empirical analysis should be viewed
as exploratory and the results merely indicative of the importance of institutional variables.
2.  Effects of institutional reliability on foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment is interesting for two reasons. First, foreign investors are likely
to be particularly sensitive to institutional problems. These investors are outsiders in the political
process.  They are not familiar with the local bureaucracy, are more familiar with market
economies, and are not always welcomed locally.  13 Second, this data is likely to be among the
most reliable data available for transition economies-FDI  inflows are unlikely to go
unrecorded.  We interpret this variable as an overall indicator of economic performance.
Tables 1 to 6 present results for the different indicators of institutional reliability.  Table 1
shows the results for the predictability of rules (question 1). In the single regression this
indicator is significant only on the 10 percent level, when we include the control variables it
becomes insignificant in 3 out of 5 cases. It remains significant at the 10 percent level in one
case and is significant at the 5 percent level in another case.  The R 2 is between 4 and 15 percent.
13  In a survey  of 117  senior  managers  of Western  manufacturing  companies  Lankes  and  Venables  (1996)  find
that  political  stability  and  perceived  risk  influence  FDI  inflows  in transition  economies.
18TABLE 1: OLS  regression
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment in percent of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -7.98  -7.36  -9.52*  -8.96  -9.85  -5.74











Predictabi-  3.16*  2.36  3.61  3.58*  3.03  2.49
lity of rules  (1.96)  (1.55)  (2.14)  (2.12)  (1.59)  (1.33)
Numb.  Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
AdjustedR 2 0.14  0.28  0.13  0.14  0.04  0.11
Standard  Errors  in Parentheses
* Significant  at 0.10 level;  **  Significant  at 0.05  level;  ***  Significant  at 0.01 level
From these results it appears that the predictability of rules is not very closely associated
with FDI.  This might be inherent to transition: the process of such a major economic
restructuring dictates a low expectation of the predictability of rules and policies and will,
therefore, not be the main concern of investment decisions.
As evidenced in most regressions displayed in this section, the control variables tend to
have the predicted sign, but they are mostly not significant on conventional levels.  In Table 1,
the level of GNP is positive indicating that a higher income per person as a proxy for a bigger
market tends to encourage FDI.  The indicator of openness is usually positive as is the schooling
variable.  A higher level of human capital and more openness seems to be beneficial for FDI
although none of the respective coefficients is significant on conventional levels.  We
unsuccessfully tried to find a better specification by including the size of the population as an
additional market size variable.  Government consumption and inflation tend to be negative in
the FDI-regressions probably meaning that more government involvement and more price
19instability  represent  distortions  that may scare  away foreign  investors. In all cases,  however,
these  propositions  are only weakly  supported  given that  the respective  variables  are mostly
insignificant  in the FDI-regressions.
Table  2 shows  results  for the political  stability  indicator. This indicator  fares much better
than  the previously  examined  one. It is significant  on the 1  percent level in all cases,  and the
simple  specifications  tested explain about  66 percent  in the FDI variation  across  our set of
countries. Given  that the other controls  are insignificant  most of the explanation  comes from the
indicator  of political  stability.
TABLE  2: OLS regression
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment in percent of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -4.41  *  -4.55***  -4.67  ***  -3.51  -6.72*  -5.27  ***











Political  1.64*  1.48  1.64*  1.70*  1.72  *  1.83  **
stability  (5.92)  (4.79)  (5.48)  (5.74)  (5.60)  (5.21)
Numb.  Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
Adjusted R2 0.66  0.67  0.63  0.65  0.66  0.66
Standard  Errors  in Parentheses
* Significant  at 0.10 level;  ** Significant  at 0.05  level; *** Significant  at 0.01 level
It appears  that the expectation  of policy surprises  due to irregular  government  changes  is
a major determinant  of foreign  investor's decisions.
20Table 3 presents results for the security of property rights.  This indicator is also highly
significant in all regressions and explains over half of the variation in FDI. It seems to be the
case that the perception of the private sector about the security of their property from theft and
crime is another major factor in explaining transition countries' relative success in attracting FDI.
TABLE  3: OLS regression
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment in percent of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -3.92*  **  -4.19***  -3.93  **  -4.53  *  -8.28  -350**











Property  2.29*  1.98  2.27***  2.29**  2.32  2.62
rights secur.  (4.59)  (3.72)  (4.21)  (4.27)  (4.34)  (3.93)
Numb. Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
Adjusted R2 0.54  0.56  0.49  0.50  0.53  0.52
Standard  Errors  in Parentheses
* Significant  at 0.10  level;  t* Significant  at 0.05  level; *  Significant  at 0.01 level
Table 4 presents the results for the indicator of the judiciary reliability . Like the previous
two indicators it is significant in all regressions on the 1 percent level and explains a large part of
the cross country variation in FDI inflows.  Based on this result, building a reliable judiciary
should be a priority for transition economies wishing to attract foreign capital.
21TABLE  4: OLS  regression
Dependent  variable:  Foreign  Direct  Investment  in percent of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -5.83***  -5.91  -6.19***  -7.07***  -10.91  *  -5.31 **











Judiciary  2.77  2.39  2.87  2.92  2.86***  2.62
reliability  (4.62)  (3.82)  (4.80)  (4.98)  (4.32)  (3.93)
Numb.  Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
Adjusted  R
2 0.54  0.57  0.56  0.58  0.52  0.53
Standard Errors in Parentheses
*  Significant at 0.10 level; **  Significant at 0.05 level; ***  Significant at 0.01 level
Table 5 shows the results for the indicator that measures the absence of corruption.  This
indicator is also significant on the 1 percent level in 5 out of 6 cases and significant on the 5
percent level in the regression controlling for inflation. The R 2 is about 50 percent.
22TABLE  5: OLS regression
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment in percent of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -6.09***  -6.23***  -5.81***  -5.40***  -7.58***  -5.68***











Lack of  2.18***  2.26*  2.27*  2.41**  2.15***  2.08***
corruption  (4.48)  (3.13)  (4.70)  (4.99)  (3.89)  (3.70)
Numb.  Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
Adjusted  R2 0.52  0.49  0.55  0.58  0.46  0.49
Standard Errors in Parentheses
*  Significant at 0.10 level; **  Significant at 0.05 level; ***  Significant at 0.01 level
Finally, we present results for an aggregate indicator composed of all previous indicators
plus a number of additional questions.  The premise is that some indicators may measure
different sides of the same phenomenon (as can be seen in the correlation matrix in the
appendix).  Therefore, it seems natural to aggregate them into one single indicator of institutional
predictability.  In Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997b) we have used this indicator in bigger
country samples and have called this overall measure "credibility of rules."
Table 6 shows the results for this overall indicator.  It is highly significant in all
regressions and explains 70 percent in the variation of FDI inflow.
23TABLE 6: OLS regression
Dependent  variable:  Foreign  Direct  Investment  in percent  of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -10.4***  -10.2***  -10.3  ***  -10.0***  -13.4***  -10.6I***











Credibility  4.06***  3.97*  4.04*  4.06*  4.12***  4.11
(6.69)  (5.17)  (6.62)  (6.66)  (6.13)  (5.69)
Numb.  Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
Adjusted R2 0.72  0.70  0.72  0.73  0.70  0.70
Standard  Errors in Parentheses
' Significant at 0.10 level;  **  Significant at 0.05 level; **  Significant at 0.01 level
These results appear to confirm our expectation that foreign investors are highly
susceptible to institutional uncertainty.
The same regression analysis with gross domestic investment as the dependent variable
was also examined.  The results were generally not significant. It is not obvious why results for
FDI and total investment should differ so much.  Major data problems in the total investment
figures for transition economies could be the culprit.  In many cases this data is mainly reflecting
the traditional sector's activity-the  problems of capturing the activity of the emerging private
sector are notorious.  Another explanation could be that the share of investment is not really a
24good indicator of performance in transition because the countries that lag in the transition process
are still investing larger amounts into unproductive ventures.  In any case it is strange that the
excellent results that we obtain with FDI do not show in total investment.  Because of the data
problems mentioned above, we tend to have more confidence in the FDI results.
3.  Effects of institutional predictability on per capita growth
Usual cross-country analysis of the reasons for differences in economic performance
focus on per capita growth rates as the variable to be explained. As was discussed earlier, growth
data for transition economies has suffered from inaccuracy and lack of comparability. The
results of this section should, therefore, be viewed with more caution than the previous one and
merely indicative of the effects of institutional predictability on growth in transition economies.
To reduce data problems we focus on the most recent period where data is available-from  1993
to 1995. Tables 7 to 12 estimate exactly the same specifications we used for FDI-regressions
with per capita growth as the endogenous variable.The drawback is that it might be problematic
to estimate growth regressions with averages of such a short time period.
Table 7 shows the results for the measure of predictability of rules.  The variable has the
expected positive sign in all specifications and tends to be significant. It is significant on the 1
percent-level in the regression controlling for openness and on the 5 percent-level in the single
regression.  In the specification controlling for government consumption, it is significant on the
10 percent-level as well as in the specification controlling for GNP.  Only in the remaining two
specifications it is insignificant.  This replicates the results for the FDI regressions: the
predictability of rules variable is the least robust in growth regressions-probably  for the same
reasons.
25TABLE 7: OLS regression
Dependent variable: Per Capita Growth 1993-1995
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -47.82  -47.18  -62.38  -60.78  -36.47  -30.34









Inflation  -0.001  *
(-1.78)
Predictabi-  13.87**  13.06*  17.41***  15.50**  10.22  8.58
lity of rules  (2.16)  (1.92)  (2.98)  (2.79)  (1.45)  (1.25)
Numb.  Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
Adjusted  R
2 0.18  0.24  0.31  0.38  0.01  0.27
Standard Errors in Parentheses
*  Significant at 0.10 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; ***  Significant at 0.01 level
Again the other control variables are insignificant in most of the regressions displayed in
this table and in all other tables in this section.  The level of initial per capita GNP is always
insignificant, and its sign switches depending on the institutional variables tested.  In traditional
growth analysis this variable would be expected to be negative due to the convergence effect
predicted by neoclassical growth theory.  However for the very short time period estimated here
this convergence effect is unlikely to show up.  Openness has the expected positive sign in all
specifications, however, it is insignificant in all cases.  Government consumption, interestingly
and in contrast to most other growth studies, is positive in all specifications.  In some
government consumption is even significantly so. The proxy for human capital is positive in all
but one case but remains completely insignificant.  Finally inflation has the expected negative
sign but is only occasionally significant at conventional levels.  All in all the specifications are
not very convincing.  We had difficulty unearthing any significant variables with the exception
of our indicators of institutional uncertainty in growth-regressions for this sample of transition
countries.
2627Table 8 shows that political stability is positive and highly significant in all specifications
estimated.  The variable alone explains 50 percent of the variation of growth rates in our sample.
TABLE  8: OLS regression
Dependent variable: Per Capita Growth 1993-1995
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -27.34  -26.88  -30.63  -30.98***  -23.90  -23.53











Political  5.86*  6.37*  5.70  5.16  5.30*  5.00**
stability  (4.25)  (4.04)  (4.24)  (3.83)  (3.63)  (2.85)
Numb. Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
Adjusted  R2 0.50  0.48  0.51  0.53  0.43  0.49
Standard  Errors in Parentheses
*  Significant  at 0.10 level;  ** Significant  at 0.05  level; *** Significant  at 0.01  level
Table 9 demonstrates the importance of property rights security for economic growth in
the countries under consideration.  The variable is always positive and alone explains about one
third of the variation in growth rates.  It is significant at the 1 percent level in the single
regression as well as in the regression controlling for government consumption.  In all other
specifications the indicator of property rights security is significant on the 5 percent-confidence
level.
28TABLE  9: OLS regression
Dependent variable: Per Capita Growth 1993-1995
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -23.87***  -23.73***  -25.92***  -35.16***  -27.16  -18.78**











Property  7.46  7.62**  7.03**  7.37*  6.71  5.94**
rights secur.  (3.03)  (2.73)  (2.84)  (3.48)  (2.78)  (2.41)
Numb.  Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
Adjusted  R2 0.32  0.28  0.29  0.48  0.28  0.43
Standard Errors in Parentheses
* Significant at 0.10 level;  **  Significant at 0.05 level; ***  Significant at 0.01 level
Table 10 estimates the indicator of the reliability of the judiciary in growth regressions.
The indicator has the expected positive sign and is significant on the 5 percent-level in the single
regression explaining about 20 percent of the variation in growth rates.  The indicator keeps its
positive sign in all specifications; in the regression controlling for government consumption it is
significant on the 1 percent-level; in the one controlling for openness on the 5 percent-level and
in the one controlling for GNP on the 10 percent-level. In the remaining two specifications, the
indicator is insignificant.
29TABLE 10: OLS  regression
Dependent variable: Per Capita Growth 1993-1995
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -25.32  -25.36  -30.30  -41.03  -25.15  -18.10











Judiciary  7.22**  6.98*  7.94**  8.62  5.81  5.12
Reliability  (2.21)  (1.90)  (2.58)  (3.30)  (1.70)  (1.57)
Numb.  Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
AdjustedR 2 0.19  0.13  0.34  0.46  0.06  0.31
Standard Errors in Parentheses
*  Significant at 0.10 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; ***  Significant at 0.01 level
Table 11 shows growth regressions for the indicator of corruption. In the single
regression the coefficient of this variable has the expected positive sign and is significant on the
10 percent-level.  The variable alone explains 16 percent of the variation in growth rates.  In the
other specifications the corruption-measure always keeps its positive sign but is not consistently
significant. In the specification controlling for openness it is significant on the 5 percent-level, in
the specifications controlling for GNP and government consumption respectively it is significant
on the 10 percent-level and in the other specifications it is insignificant.
30TABLE 11: OLS regression
Dependent variable: Per Capita Growth 1993-1995
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -25.10*  -27.95**  -27.44**  -30.20***  -17.36  -16.21











Lack of  5.41*  7.27*  5.73**  4.98*  4.09  3.35
corruption  (2.05)  (1.87)  (2.24)  (1.96)  (1.49)  (1.21)
Numb.  Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
Adjusted R2 0.16  0.13  0.18  0.24  0.02  0.27
Standard  Errors  in Parentheses
*  Significant  at 0.10  level; ** Significant  at 0.05 level;  ***  Significant  at 0.01  level
Finally, table 12 reports the results for the overall indicator of credibility of rules that
consists of the average of questions in each of the categories mentioned above.  This summary
measure of the reliability of the institutional framework alone explains 27 percent of the cross-
country variations in growth rates of the transition economies.  It has the expected positive sign
in all specifications and in almost all cases (the exception being the specification controlling for
the inflation rate) is significant on the 5 percent-level.
31TABLE  12: OLS  regression
Dependent  variable:  Per Capita  Growth  1993-1995
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -39.64***  -42.59**  -42.37***  -46.4***  -33.72  -29.55**











Credibility  11.40***  13.46**  11.42***  10.80***  9.44*  8.42*
(2.96)  (2.80)  (3.12)  (3.20)  (2.32)  (1.98)
Numb.  Obs.  18  18  17  17  16  17
Adjusted  R
2 0.31  0.29  0.34  0.44  0.18  0.37
Standard Errors in Parentheses
* Significant at 0.10 level; **  Significant at 0.05 level; ***  Significant at 0.01 level
As mentioned above, the direction of causality might be a problem for the growth
regressions.  For this reason Table 13 estimates instrumental variable regressions for all measures
of institutional uncertainty using an indicator of political rights as instrument for the various
institutional variables.  The results suggest that reverse causality may not be a major problem.
All indicators are significant on the 1 percent-level.
32TABLE  13: Instrumental  variable  regressions
Dependent  variable:  Per Capita  Growth
Political  rights (1993/1994)  as instrument  for institutional  variables
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -117.68  -36.24  -35.70  -47.00  48.13  -59.84***
(-3.82)  (-4.32)  (4.32)  (4.15)  (-4.08)  (-3.99)
Predictabi-  37.21




rights secur.  (3.60)
Judiciary  15.45***
reliability  (3.62)




Numb.  Obs.  18  18  18  18  18  18
Adjusted R
2 0.42  0.42  0.41  0.42  0.41  0.41
Standard Errors in Parentheses
* Significant at 0.10 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; ***  Significant at 0.01 level
Summary  and  Conclusions
We have presented  and analyzed  a new data set based  on firm-level  surveys  in transition
economies. The survey  aimed at measuring  the degree  of private entrepreneurial  confidence  in
the institutional  framework. We distinguish  different  dimensions  of this institutional  reliability
namely  the predictability  of rules,  political  stability,  property  rights security,  judiciary reliability
and lack of corruption. We first presented  survey  results for the transition  countries  on a region
by region basis. In a second  step we studied  the relationship  of these different  institutional
indicators  with cross-country  differences  in inflows  of foreign  direct  investment  and in per capita
growth.
33The regression  results  indicate  that property  rights  security,  political  stability,  judiciary
reliability  and lack of corruption  are all very important  factors  affecting  the inflow  of foreign
direct  investment. The coefficients  of these variables  were highly significant  in all specifications
tested. Less clear is the importance  of the predictability  of rules which has always  a positive sign
in FDI-regressions,  but it is not significant  in all specifications.  The growth  regressions  must be
treated  with caution  as they were derived  from inferior  data and were examined  over a very short
time period. Nevertheless,  they indicate  that property  rights security  and political  stability  are
particularly  important  for economic  growth. The respective  coefficients  are always  highly
significant. The other institutional  indicators-predictability of rules,  judiciary reliability  and
lack of corruption-are less clearly  related  to cross-country  differences  in growth. The
coefficients  of these  variables  always  have  the expected  sign but they are not significant  in all
specifications.  The different  indicators  of institutional  reliability  intend  to measure  different
phenomena  but, of course,  many of them overlap. They  tend to be rather highly correlated. For
this reason we did not estimate  them in the same  regressions  but we constructed  an indicator  of
credibility  that is a simple  average  of the different  dimensions. This indicator  proves  to be
highly significant  in both FDI- and growth-regressions.  Overall,  the results of this analysis
suggest  that the guarantee  of a reliable institutional  framework  may  be an important  precondition
for the successful  transition  and improved  economic  performance  of former  planned economies.
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Regional Grouping of the surveyed transitional economies:
Balkan region:  Baltic region:
Albania *  Estonia
Bulgaria  Latvia
Macedonia, FYR*  Lithuania
Caucasus region:  Central Asia region:
Armenia  Kazakstan
Azerbaijan  Kyrgyz republic
Georgia  Uzbekistan
Slavic countries of the FSU and Moldova:  Visegrad countries:
Belarus  Czech Republic
Moldova  Hungary
Russia  Poland
Ukraine  Slovak Republic.
Countries marked with a * were not used in the econometric analysis.
36Appendix 2: Survey questionnaire  and
regional averages for individual questions (in percentage)
CIS  CEE  Visegrad  Baltic  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic
including  countries  countries  countries  countries  Asia  countries of
Baltic  countries  the FSU and
States  Moldova
Questionnaires returned  650  713  280  199  234  225  202  223
Questionnaires sent  1,134  2,070  1,150  548  372  287  301  546
Company Size:
less than 50 employees  61  43  34.1  35.6  62.3  60.3  70.9  55.1
> 50 and < 200 employees  23  29  27.8  35.6  24.9  26.6  19.5  23.2
more than 200 employees  15  27  37.2  28.7  12.3  12.0  8.5  21.7
Industry:
Manufacturing  35  45  47.8  36.2  50.4  39.0  34.8  32.5
Services  57  43  44.8  49.5  34.3  54.3  58.9  57.6
Agriculture  7  11  5.9  13.2  14.9  5.2  5.9  9.9
Location of management:
Capital city  61  39  23.2  58.0  40.9  69.6  81.2  39.9
Large city  21  31  39.2  21.0  30.3  20.0  6.7  31.3
Small city or countryside  18  29  37.3  20.5  27.9  9.6  12.1  28.0
38  61  76.4  41.6  58.2  29.6  18.8  59.3
Foreign participation:
yes  25  25  25.5  29.3  17.3  29.6  29.7  1.
no  73  74  73.9  68.9  81.6  64.4  69.9  80.6
Exports:
yes  28  47  52.2  52.0  31.3  26.8  25.3  30.3
no  72  53  47.8  48.0  68.7  73.2  74.7  69.7
1.  PREDICTABILITY  OF LAWS AND POLICIES
I
1.  Do you regularly have to cope with unexpected changes in rules, laws or policies which materially affect your business?
Changes in laws and policies are
-1 completely predictable  2  2  0.5  0.7  4.9  4.1  2.1  1.4
-2 highly predictable  4  6  1.4  4.6  13.7  9.8  2.2  0.9
-3 fairly predictable  16  26  31.8  23.3  21.6  24.6  10.9  13.9
-4 fairly unpredictable  37  41  46.1  44.7  29.7  31.3  43.6  35.4
-5 highly unpredictable  27  17  12.9  20.2  19.2  22.2  28.1  28.9
-6 completely unpredictable  14  8  7.3  6.4  10.3  8.0  12.1  19.6
2.  Do you expect the government to stick to announced major policies?
-I  always  2  4  1.2  0.8  12.1  6.8  0.0  0.4
-2 mostly  20  21  19.9  20.9  22.9  30.8  18.5  13.2
-3 frequently  11  22  24.3  22.4  18.1  16.0  10.6  7.9
-4 sometimes  35  29  32.4  34.2  18.4  23.2  43.6  38.5
-5 seldom  23  16  14.6  16.6  16.0  17.9  20.2  29.6
-6 never  8  8  7.6  5.1  10.7  5.2  6.5  10.4
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3. "The process of developing new rules or policies is usually such that affected businesses are informed."
This is true
-I  always  3  2  0.8  0.7  6.1  3.7  3.9  2.3
-2 mostly  13  8  7.2  3.5  14.6  13.9  12.0  12.0
-3 frequently  7  11  12.6  10.0  11.1  10.5  4.6  6.2
-4 sometimes  32  26  27.4  27.9  20.9  27.8  29.0  38.1
-5 seldom  28  34  32.8  41.7  29.1  27.0  31.1  25.3
-6 never  17  18  18.8  16.1  17.5  17.1  19.0  15.7
4.  "In case of important changes in laws or policies affecting my business operation the govemment takes into account
concems voiced either by me or by my business association."
This is true
-1 always  I  1  0.5  0.7  3.0  2.2  1.2  0.4
-2 mostly  5  4  1.6  1.4  10.9  10.1  3.3  3.4
-3 frequently  5  5  3.0  5.9  5.2  9.2  3.8  2.2
-4 sometimes  18  24  29.0  25.3  17.0  24.5  18.9  12.9
-5 seldom  31  33  32.2  44.7  22.3  23.2  33.4  35.8
-6 never  38  31  31.0  20.4  40.7  30.0  38.6  44.5
5.  Do you fear retroactive changes of regulations that are important for your business operations?
-1 always  20  14  7.6  16.3  19.9  12.9  15.8  29.6
-2 mostly  24  15  8.0  14.1  25.3  14.2  30.0  26.1
-3 frequently  24  20  22.8  21.7  14.5  18.0  25.4  26.3
4  sometimes  22  29  35.8  28.9  18.5  35.7  24.0  11.2
-5 seldom  7  14  18.3  12.8  8.9  13.1  2.0  5.4
-6 never  3  6  3.5  5.4  11.6  6.1  1.9  1.4
6.  In the last ten yrs predictability of laws and policies has
increased  20  30  21.5  36.2  35.5  40.9  12.4  9.0
remained aboutthe same  36  31  39.2  32.3  17.9  31.0  38.2  36.9
decreased  33  28  30.8  21.1  32.3  16.0  33.1  46.3
don't know  11  10  8.1  10.0  13.4  11.4  14.8  7.4
I.  POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND SECURITY OF PROPERTY
I  I
7.  "Constitutional changes of govemment (as a result of elections) are usually accompanied by large changes in rules
and regulations that have an impact on my business."
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
-1 fully agree  19  17  16.8  12.4  20.3  18.1  17.3  21.9
-2 agree in most cases  23  20  17.6  20.8  23.6  27.9  19.9  20.5
-3 tend to agree  32  30  29.6  39.0  22.0  29.4  35.3  31.3
-4 tend to disagree  15  14  14.1  16.1  10.5  14.5  12.7  16.1
-5 disagree in most cases  8  11  13.7  8.9  8.9  5.4  9.1  7.9
-6 strongly disagree  1  6  4.6  1.6  10.8  1.0  0.4  0.5
does not apply  3  3  3.7  1.2  2.7  3.6  4.9  1.3
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8. "I constantly fear unconstitutional govemment changes (i.e. coups) that are accompanied by far-reaching policy
surprises with significant impact on my business."
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
-1 fully agree  28  17  5.5  9.1  39.4  34.6  15.0  32.3
-2 agree in most cases  17  7  3.2  10.4  9.9  14.8  14.3  20.8
-3 tend to agree  21  11  10.6  13.6  9.5  14.1  29.3  19.5
-4 tend to disagree  17  16  9.9  21.1  20.2  14.6  20.6  15.0
-5 disagree in most cases  8  17  21.4  23.6  4.4  10.2  8.6  6.3
-6 strongly disagree  4  26  42.3  18.9  12.6  5.7  3.7  3.9
does not apply
9. "Theft and crime are serious problems that can substantially increase the costs of doing  business."
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
-1 fully agree  53  41  32.8  32.4  60.8  40.2  54.6  61.9
-2 agree in most cases  19  20  15.1  34.6  11.6  20.5  23.3  13.9
-3 tend to agree  15  18  25.2  14.8  13.1  15.7  12.3  16.7
-4 tend to disagree  7  8  8.3  9.5  4.5  10.8  7.5  4.4
-5 disagree in most cases  2  9  13.3  7.8  3.6  5.6  0.0  1.8
-6 strongly disagree  2  4  5.4  0.8  5.1  3.3  1.2  0.9
-I  fully agree  44  19  18.3  29.6  10.0  66.3  32.9  36.1
-2 agree in most cases  19  12  10.2  20.9  4.6  12.4  23.4  21.7
-3 tend to agree  16  18  23.1  24.0  6.2  5.7  22.3  20.2
-4 tendtodisagree  7  11  13.2  13.0  5.2  3.6  6.9  10.4
-5 disagree in most cases  4  12  20.2  6.6  7.1  5.2  2.8  4.8
-6 strongly disagree  2  10  12.3  2.7  12.9  2.0  1.6  2.6
10. "I am not confident that the state authorities protect my person and my property from criminal actions"
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
-1 fully agree  49  36  36.8  34.5  37.4  25.5  54.2  62.9
-2 agree in most cases  15  23  24.8  23.6  19.6  21.6  11.1  13.2
-3 tend to agree  13  20  20.6  23.5  16.4  19.9  14.1  7.2
-4 tend to disagree  7  10  7.7  10.6  11.9  10.3  6.5  5.4
-5 disagree in most cases  9  8  8.5  7.4  6.7  13.3  9.1  5.3
-6 strongly disagree  5  3  1.5  0.5  6.4  6.2  2.9  4.7
-1 fully agree  40  22  24.4  33.4  8.8  45.0  35.4  40.8
-2 agree in most cases  18  13  14.6  18.6  4.8  13.4  20.0  19.6
-3 tendto  agree  13  18  23.6  23.3  6.8  10.4  16.6  12.8
-4 tend to disagree  11  12  16.2  10.3  7.6  9.1  13.0  11.8
-5 disagree in most cases  7  11  13.3  9.2  8.3  9.1  6.6  5.3
-6 strongly disagree  6  6  5.3  1.9  9.9  7.7  2.0  6.5
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11. "Unpredictability of the judiciary presents a major problem for my business operations."
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
-1 fully agree  34  26  26.1  19.4  33.6  20.6  44.5  36.1
-2 agree in most cases  24  16  14.3  16.9  19.0  24.1  27.4  22.3
-3 tendto  agree  21  25  22.2  31.7  23.6  25.8  17.3  19.9
-4 tend to disagree  13  14  13.6  22.5  7.3  17.9  5.9  15.8
-S disagree in most cases  3  10  15.6  6.3  6.0  6.2  3.1  1.8
-6 strongly disagree  1  5  7.1  2.8  5.8  2.0  1.6  1.l
-1 fully agree  32  15  17.8  19.8  6.1  42.2  32.0  23.4
-2 agree in mostcases  22  14  12.2  25.5  5.6  15.9  28.7  20.9
-3 tendto  agree  20  18  19.7  27.2  7.5  15.9  15.7  25.8
-4 tendto  disagree  13  14  18.5  17.6  5.4  11.5  8.9  16.8
-5 disagree in mostcases  4  10  16.7  4.6  7.1  4.8  4.7  3.5
-6 strongly disagree  3  7  9.8  1.3  9.0  3.7  4.1  1.9
111.  OVERALL GOVERNMENT  - BUSINESS  INTERFACE
12.  Please judge on a six point scale how problematic these different policy areas are for doing business
I
a. Regulations for starting business/new operations
I No obstacles  19  16  17.9  14.7  13.1  23.0  21.1  15.4
2  11  18  15.9  23.7  13.9  12.4  11.9  10.4
3  26  25  19.5  29.1  27.8  28.3  32.5  20.5
4  21  17  18.0  17.2  16.9  12.3  22.3  26.7
5  12  9  5.8  6.0  16.3  12.5  8.5  13.3
6 Very strong obstacles  6  5  3.8  3.3  8.9  3.8  1.8  10.5
b.  Price controls
I No obstacles  21  29  28.9  35.0  23.3  24.8  20.4  17.5
2  14  21  18.8  24.4  20.9  15.0  12.4  15.4
3  20  17  13.9  20.6  18.8  17.8  18.6  21.9
4  21  11  7.1  11.2  15.8  13.8  26.0  22.0
5  12  8  7.6  2.3  13.3  14.1  13.3  10.2
6 Very strong obstacles  7  3  2.6  1.6  5.0  6.3  4.8  9.4
c.  Regulations on foreign trade (exports, imports)
I No obstacles  9  12  14.9  8.8  11.4  15.4  6.4  5.7
2  6  15  12.4  21.1  13.1  8.4  4.1  5.6
3  16  22  17.6  25.4  24.6  17.1  18.3  13.6
4  26  19  16.9  24.8  17.4  18.5  30.2  27.4
5  22  12  7.9  9.3  18.7  17.0  20.8  26.8
6 Very strong obstacles  14  7  7.9  5.7  8.6  10.8  15.4  14.5
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d.  Financing
I No obstacles  7  7  5.4  6.5  10.2  13.0  3.5  4.4
2  7  6  7.3  4.9  5.1  6.8  8.6  5.8
3  14  11  12.9  8.4  11.6  15.1  14.6  13.1
4  22  18  18.7  22.5  13.3  18.3  27.0  21.2
5  24  26  23.6  30.1  23.9  17.0  27.2  26.3
6 Very strong obstacles  19  25  22.2  23.8  31.3  16.9  13.8  25.6
e.  Labor regulations
I No obstacles  24  12  8.8  10.7  18.6  25.0  18.5  26.9
2  17  19  13.0  29.3  18.3  14.4  18.7  16.9
3  25  25  20.5  33.5  21.0  22.8  28.8  23.2
4  19  16  18.0  11.1  18.8  15.9  23.5  17.7
5  7  10  12.8  7.6  10.1  8.4  4.5  8.0
6 Very strong obstacles  2  7  7.8  4.1  7.5  1.8  2.5  2.9
f.  Foreign currency  regulations
I No obstacles  13  21  17.8  31.5  13.5  16.9  12.3  10.9
2  10  19  17.1  26.4  13.9  12.2  8 1  9.3
3  17  17  15.1  20.3  17.1  17.6  17.5  15.0
4  21  14  14.3  9.1  17.5  22.4  21.6  20.3
5  17  11  8.7  4.6  18.8  9.3  19.6  21.9
6 Very strong obstacles  15  6  3.9  1.1  15.3  11.2  17.5  16.9
g.  Tax regulations and/or  high taxes
I No obstacles  2  2  0.9  2.3  4.1  3.7  1.6  1.3
2  2  2  1.8  3.2  2.4  4.5  0.4  2.1
3  4  9  6.2  10.3  10.5  7.5  3.4  3.0
4  9  13  11.3  14.9  12.3  11.8  7.2  7.7
5  26  29  31.7  28.2  27.4  27.4  32.9  19.9
6 Very strong obstacles  54  42  44.2  39.6  41.5  41.9  53.1  64.3
h.  Inadequate supply of  infrastructure
I NoobstaGles  4  4  3.2  3.9  4.5  5.1  3.1  3.9
2  7  8  7.9  14.1  3.4  10.2  3.4  7.3
3  24  18  17.1  26.6  11.1  20.6  29.7  22.2
4  27  23  21.7  27.2  22.0  21.9  26.9  29.8
5  20  21  20.4  15.2  26.2  18.4  20.6  20.8
6 Very strong obstacles  10  14  9.6  6.7  28.5  12.2  10.5  7.2
i.  Policy instability
I No obstacles  3  6  3.2  4.3  12.7  7.0  0.4  1.7
2  5  13  12.8  12.1  13.9  8.0  2.3  4.7
3  16  17  15.2  19.3  18.7  20.2  18.7  10.2
4  19  20  17.8  28.5  14.2  18.1  21.6  18.9
5  29  22  19.3  23.4  23.9  21.2  34.4  29.7
6 Very strong obstacles  23  13  15.9  9.7  13.6  17.6  18.8  30.6
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j.  Safety or environmental  regulations
I No obstacles  26  11  6.3  11.8  15.3  29.2  22.2  25.7
2  21  22  18.2  26.0  23.2  22.2  23.0  19.3
3  22  25  21.3  31.7  21.6  14.4  28.3  24.0
4  12  16  16.6  14.3  17.4  12.0  14.8  10.3
5  8  11  11.8  9.5  13.1  8.4  6.8  9.6
6 Very strong obstacles  4  4  4.3  1.3  4.7  5.7  1.1  4.6
k.  Inflation
I No obstacles  8  7  1.7  7.1  14.8  14.6  1.9  8.5
2  12  13  11.7  11.3  18.0  16.1  9.3  10.9
3  17  16  12.4  23.5  12.9  12.4  19.1  17.9
4  20  20  18.0  33.0  9.9  22.6  18.4  18.8
5  21  19  24.0  17.3  13.6  14.6  23.8  22.9
6 Very strong obstacles  18  19  22.4  5.6  27.3  12.4  25.1  15.8
1.  General uncertainty on  costs of regulations
I No obstacles  2  5  4.2  4.1  5.4  3.1  1.1  0.9
2  5  12  10.4  13.8  13.3  7.9  3.5  4.9
3  18  19  15.6  19.3  24.9  25.3  14.6  14.2
4  25  19  19.5  21.9  14.3  24.6  22.7  26.4
5  32  24  21.7  22.4  27.4  21.3  39.4  33.7
6 Very strong obstacles  12  11  10.7  9.8  11.6  5.4  12.4  15.4
m.Crime and theft
I No obstacles  5  3  4.1  1.4  4.5  8.6  4.4  2.9
2  6  9  11.3  8.1  7.6  9.6  5.4  4.6
3  15  18  18.3  22.3  11.8  18.6  13.1  13.5
4  20  21  16.8  25.9  21.7  21.8  20.6  18.9
5  28  24  17.1  26.3  29.4  22.8  32.3  28.7
6 Very strong obstacles  20  16  14.3  14.3  21.5  12.5  19.0  27.4
n.  Corruption
I No obstacles  6  5  5.6  2.5  6.0  8.3  3.8  6.8
2  5  5  5.1  7.8  2.4  6.5  4.1  5.2
3  I1  14  13.9  16.7  10.3  9.9  7.3  13.8
4  19  19  15.9  20.1  21.7  20.0  17.2  19.8
5  29  29  20.6  34.4  35.1  24.0  31.1  31.5
6 Very strong obstacles  25  21  24.5  16.9  21.5  27.3  31.0  19.4
o.  Terrorism
I No obstacles  31  34  34.4  38.5  27.7  30.7  33.0  28.6
2  17  19  15.8  30.4  12.2  13.1  19.8  18.3
3  15  12  13.1  8.6  13.2  10.6  16.4  16.0
4  9  9  6.8  6.7  14.5  12.2  5.8  9.3
5  10  8  3.9  6.9  15.8  10.9  7.9  10.5
6 Very strong obstacles  7  5  1.5  3.5  10.2  9.6  2.9  7.2
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p.  Other
I No obstacles  2  2  0.9  0.9  6.1  3.1  3.4  1.0
2  2  1  0.0  0.0  5.0  3.2  0.4  1.4
3  2  6  0.5  1.0  17.0  3.5  3.4  0.9
4  2  3  0.5  0.5  7.9  1.5  1.9  1.6
5  4  3  1.8  3.2  4.8  5.0  1.7  4.2
6 Very strong obstacles  3  3  4.3  3.4  0.8  4.1  3.0  1.3
13. Please rate your overall perception of the relation between government and/or bureaucracy and private firms on the following scale.
"All in all, for doing business I perceive the state as":
I Helping Hand  5  3  1.5  0.7  6.6  10.4  5.0  0.8
2  8  10  12.1  5.2  11.5  13.2  8.8  4A
3  27  25  27.9  29.3  17.5  32.2  21.0  27.2
4  26  28  27.5  30.5  25.5  22.4  31.7  23.5
5  24  19  20.1  22.7  13.3  10.5  24.3  34.0
6 Opponent  9  14  8.9  10.6  22.9  8.4  8.0  9.1
I Helping Hand  8  3  2.4  1.4  5.5  11.4  6.3  5.9
2  11  12  14.8  13.9  7.9  6.4  12.4  14.3
3  25  18  20.9  28.6  5.1  24.4  17.4  31.4
4  21  16  18.2  22.6  6.6  11.5  28.1  23.0
5  20  17  17.5  20.3  13.3  23.5  21.2  15.9
6 Opponent  10  21  21.9  9.4  30.6  15.7  8.2  6.5
IV. BUREAUCRATIC RED TAPE
14. "It is common for  firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular "additional payments" to get things done."
This is true
-1 always  19  8  4.1  4.3  17.3  22.8  19.4  15.3
-2 mostly  26  18  15.8  15.1  23.8  26.4  25.4  26.2
-3 frequently  20  18  18.5  20.3  15.4  20.1  21.6  17.8
-4 sometimes  20  22  24.7  23.4  16.1  17.0  21.7  21.0
-5 seldom  8  20  23.3  21.5  14.7  6.7  5.6  10.5
-6 never  6  13  12.6  14.7  10.8  6.7  2.7  9.2
15.  "Firms in my line of business usually know in advance about how much this "additional payment  is."
This is true
-1 always  12  6  2.0  6.6  10.9  17.0  9.8  9.4
-2 mosty  33  18  17.2  18.1  18.1  29.5  33.4  34.3
-3 frequently  16  17  16.7  16.0  17.4  13.6  20.1  15.6
-4 sometimes  20  19  21.2  18.0  18.4  22.5  20.1  18.2
-5 seldom  10  22  25.6  20.3  17.6  9.2  8.2  11.2
-6 never  8  15  15.3  16.2  14.2  7.4  4.7  10.9
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16. "Even if a firm has to make an "additional paymenf' it always has to fear that  it will be asked for more, e.g. by another official."
This is true
-1 always  10  6  2.7  2.7  14.3  12.6  14.6  5.3
-2 mostly  17  10  9.0  7.9  11.9  16.1  14.9  20.4
-3 frequently  20  15  11.2  13.8  20.9  21.4  20.2  18.4
-4 sometimes  28  23  23.1  25.1  20.3  26.2  29.2  27.5
-5 seldom  14  25  30.7  24.9  16.4  13.8  12.5  16.4
-6 never  8  18  20.4  20.4  11.8  8.7  4.6  9.5
17. "If a firm pays the required "additional payment" the service is usually also delivered as agreed."
This is true
-1 always  11  13  8.7  12.9  17.3  14.6  8.4  10.9
-2 mostly  44  36  42.1  32.6  32.6  45.7  42.9  42.5
-3 frequently  19  19  18.0  23.7  15.9  16.4  21.8  17.6
-4 sometimes  12  10  9.1  7.6  15.1  12.6  12.6  10.8
-5 seldom  5  6  4.8  6.1  6.4  5.6  5.4  5.4
-6 never  6  6  6.3  5.9  6.1  3.5  3.1  9.7
18. "If a govemment agent acts against the rules I can usually go to another official or to his superior and get the correct treatment."
This is true
-I  always  4  7  6.1  6.0  7.8  7.4  2.7  3.5
-2 mostly  10  16  11.8  25.7  12.0  11.1  10.3  9.2
-3 frequently  11  10  10.3  11.9  8.0  15.2  10.5  8.3
-4 sometimes  25  25  29.5  24.4  20.8  20.7  28.2  24.6
-5 seldom  34  27  26.9  24.1  28.4  31.7  35.8  33.8
-6 never  14  12  10.9  5.9  20.2  13.0  8.8  17.8
19. In the last ten yrs, difficulties in dealing with govemment officials have
increased  40  38  32.5  37.8  44.2  26.8  47.6  45.2
remained about the same  35  33  44.7  30.9  20.1  36.6  33.3  34.8
decreased  13  20  15.3  23.7  22.2  29.1  4.0  8.2
don't know  10  8  6.2  6.0  12.1  7.4  12.6  10.5
20.  Have you ever decided not to make a major investment because of problems relating to complying with govemment regulations?
yes  49  39  37.6  33.5  45.2  39.9  51.8  53.4
no  51  61  62.4  66.5  54.8  60.1  48.2  46.6
If your answer was "yes", could you please specify which of the following two options better describes the nature of these problems:
Costsofcompliancearetoohigh,but  11  19  15.3  21.6  21.7  14.8  9.8  8.9
clearly known
Costs of compliance are too uncertain for  74  67  70.7  69.8  60.2  72.6  80.8  69.4
investment planning
Other  15  14  14.0  8.6  18.2  12.6  9.3  21.6
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21.  What percentage of senior management's time is spent on negotiation with officials about changes
and interpretations of laws and regulations?
(1)  lessthan5%  20  33  33.4  36.1  30.0  17.7  15.4  24.0
(2)  5%-  15%  22  32  37.4  28.4  29.0  19.0  20.7  24.0
(3)  15%-25%  24  20  18.3  26.3  17.4  27.8  23.0  22.8
(4)  25%-50%  15  8  7.1  5.6  11.3  20.1  13.1  13.1
(5)  50%-75%  9  2  1.3  0.7  3.5  9.0  11.2  8.0
(6)  more than 75%  3  1  0.8  0.0  3.5  2.8  3.7  2.7
V.  EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENT  IN PROVIDING SERVICES
I
22.  Please rate your overall perception of:
a. The efficiency of customs
I Very good  1  2  3.7  0.0  2.5  1.4  1.5  1.2
2  3  14  25.3  3.8  9.0  1.8  1.3  4.7
3  15  20  22.1  18.4  18.6  15.5  13.5  16.3
4  25  23  17.7  22.2  31.3  22.5  27.1  24.7
5  27  24  16.7  34.6  23.2  26.2  29.2  26.7
6 Very poor  25  1  2  6.2  19.1  11.2  29.9  25.2  21.5
b. The general condition of roads you use
I Very good  I  1  0.8  0.7  3.3  1.5  0.4  0.4
2  3  1  5  24.2  7.9  9.6  1.2  3.2  5.4
3  8  22  19.2  28.4  18.6  10.1  4.8  9.9
4  16  20  21.1  25.6  13.8  14.6  14.1  19.6
5  27  20  21.0  25.5  14.6  26.0  32.3  23.3
6 Very poor  41  18  9.3  7.8  39.5  44.0  43.5  35.8
c. The efficiency of mail delivery
I Very good  3  9  16.0  4.0  4.2  5.1  1.5  1.7
2  8  20  22.6  22.7  14.9  7.3  6.3  10.4
3  18  34  29.4  47.7  25.7  13.0  16.1  23.9
4  24  17  14.8  16.5  20.9  19.3  25.1  26.8
5  24  12  10.0  7.4  18.2  23.1  31.9  17.7
6 Very poor  21  5  1.3  0.9  12.9  31.0  17.2  16.5
d. The quality of public health care
provision
I Very good  I  1  1.2  0.0  2.4  1.0  1.1  2.2
2  3  16  29.3  4.4  8.4  3.4  0.8  4.1
3  9  20  23.2  17.3  19.8  9.4  8.3  9.9
4  17  23  16.5  31.2  24.7  24.5  7.7  18.6
5  29  21  13.6  31.6  21.0  20.5  35.6  30.9
6 Very poor  38  15  11.3  15.1  20.9  39.6  44.9  32.2
45CIS  CEE  Visegrad  Baltic  Balkan  Caucasus  Central  Slavic
including  countries  countries  countries  countries  Asia  countries  of
Baltic  countries  the FSU and
States  Moldova
23.  How frequent are power outages?
-1 once in more than 3 m.  34  65  64.4  86.2  44.3  16.4  28.9  50.0
-2 once amonth  30  15  18.7  7.3  17.5  28.5  42.2  21.0
-3 once in twoweeks  6  6  3.3  0.4  15.1  8.8  5.7  5.1
-4 once aweek  10  6  3.1  2.9  13.1  13.0  12.2  7.3
-5 once aday  12  2  0.2  0.0  6.1  19.7  8.4  9.1
-6 nopowerforlongperiod  7  3  6.1  0.0  1.2  13.2  1.8  6.2
24.  How long does it take to get a public telephone line connected?
-1 less than I month  26  23  17.7  35.2  16.6  39.2  15.3  24.5
-2 I to 3 months  22  22  26.4  24.1  15.5  21.9  26.2  18.9
-3 3 to 6 months  5  12  15.6  3.9  14.9  4.0  5.0  6.3
-4 6 months to I year  4  7  7.0  3.5  12.1  2.1  2.1  7.3
-5 more than I year  5  10  14.2  3.0  11.1  1.5  8.6  5.0
-6 difficult to say  35  24  17.9  29.2  27.8  28.2  40.5  35.5
25.  How would you generally rate the efficiency of government in delivering services?
-I  very efficient  0  1  0.0  0.0  2.3  1.4  0.0  0.0
-2 efficient  2  4  4.2  0.9  7.4  4.7  0.4  1.7
-3 mostly efficient  22  32  32.1  29.0  34.4  35.4  17.8  14.9
-4 mostly inefficient  38  35  36.1  45.7  22.4  33.4  41.0  40.3
-5 inefficient  22  16  16.6  18.4  13.3  14.4  24.2  24.9
-6 very inefficient  13  9  7.8  3.7  16.7  8.4  12.4  15.9
-I very efficient  I  1  0.0  0.0  4.4  1.2  0.7  0.4
-2 efficient  6  4  1.2  2.2  8.3  5.7  3.7  7.3
-3 mostly efficient  16  19  21.0  19.9  15.0  10.4  16.0  19.3
-4 mostly inefficient  36  30  37.2  34.0  15.5  30.1  34.6  41.3
-5 inefficient  21  20  21.0  27.3  10.9  20.1  26.4  17.9
-6 very inefficient  14  14  13.9  12.8  16.9  24.6  9.9  8.7
Additional  comments  22  24  24.8  20.6  25.6  41.8  18.8  8.5
46Appendix 3.  Correlation matrix
FD1939 GDP93 GNPU  SCH93  OPEN9 DEFL9 GGC93 GASTP Ql  Q8  Q9  Qll  Q14  CRE
5  95  S92  395  395  95  R  D
FD19395  1,00
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  18  _  _  _  _  _  _
GDP9395  0,51  1,00
18  18
GNPUS92  0,52  0,22  1,00
18  18  18
SCH93  0,06  -0,03  0,20  1,00
16  16  16  16  _  .
OPEN9395  -0,01  0,14  0,11  0,34  1,00
17  17  17  15  171
DEFL9395  -0,36  -0,54  -0,40  0,19  -0,06  1,00
17  17  17  15  16  17
GGC9395  0,04  0,40  0,31  0,21  0,38  -0,67  1,00
17  17  17  15  17  16  17
GASTPR  -0,53  -0,67  -0,47  0,36  0,05  0,34  0,00  1,00
18  18  18  16  17  17  17  18
Qi  0,44  0,47  0,26  -0,10  -0,13  -0,42  0,12  -0,53  1,00
18  18  18  16  17  17  17  18  18
Q8  0,83  0,73  0,46  -0,03  -0,08  -0,56  0,22  -0,65  0,62  1,00
18  18  18  16  17  17  17  18  18  18
Q9  0,75  0,60  0,41  -0,17  -0,03  -0,30  -0,08  -0,66  0,53  0,85  1,00
18  18  18  16  17  17  17  18  18  18  18
Qll  0,76  0,48  0,39  -0,20  -0,06  -0,31  -0,13  -0,65  0,74  0,78  0,85  1,00
18  18  18  16  17  17  17  18  18  18  18  18
Q14  0,75  0,46  0,72  -0,01  0,11  -0,39  0,28  -0,66  0,33  0,66  0,55  0,48  1,00
18  18  18  16  17  17  17  18  18  18  18  18  18
CRED  0,86  0,59  0,58  -0,07  -0,02  -0,43  0,10  -0,70  0,72  0,90  0,91  0,89  0,75  1,00
18  18  18  16  17  17  17  18  18  18  18  18  18  18
47Appendix 4.1.  Foreign direct investment - regressions for additional indicators
FDI
Variable  Adjusted  R 2 Parameter  Standard  Error  T for  Prob> ITI
Estimate  I HO:Parameter=0 
INTERCEP  -5,968  4,472  -1,334  0,201
Q2  2,215  1,324  1,673  0,114
Adjusted R 2 0,096
INTERCEP  8,101  5,637  1,437  0,170
Q4  -2,922  2,482  -1,177  0,256
Adjusted R 2 0,022
INTERCEP  -5,278  2,206  -2,393  0,029
05  2,127  0,685  3,105  0,007
Adjusted R 2 0,337
INTERCEP  -4,828  2,483  -1,944  0,070
QIO  2,610  1,015  2,571  0,021
INTERCEP  8,504  1,635  5,202  0,000
Q15  -1,763  0,404  -4,368  0,001
Adjusted R 2 0,515
INTERCEP  -7,595  2,508  -3,029  0,008
Q16  2,270  0,622  3,652  0,002
Adjusted R 2 0,421
INTERCEP  6,537  4,270  1,531  0,145
Q17  -1,100  0,925  -1,189  0,252
Adjusted R2 0,024
48Appendix 4.2.  GDP growth regressions for additional indicators
Variable  Adjusted  R 2 Parameter  Standard  Error  T for  Prob  >  TI
Estimate  HO:Parameter=0
INTERCEP  -25,206  19,127  -1,318  0,206
Q2  5,622  5,661  0,993  0,336
Adjusted  R 2 -0,001
INTERCEP  3,360  12,295  0,273  0,788
Q3  -3,466  4,369  -0,793  0,439
Adjusted  R 2 -0,022
INTERCEP  -15,034  23,786  -0,632  0,536
Q4  3,860  10,474  0,369  0,717
Adjusted  R 2 -0,054
INTERCEP  -32,668  9,179  -3,559  0,003
Q5  8,296  2,850  2,911  0,010
Adjusted  R 2 0,305
INTERCEP  -13,797  11,850  -1,164  0,261
Q10  3,102  4,843  0,641  0,531
Adjusted  R 2 -0,036
INTERCEP  9,733  8,958  1,087  0,293
Q15  -4,026  2,212  -1,820  0,088
Adjusted  R 2 0,120
INTERCEP  -41,014  10,672  -3,843  0,001
Q16  8,683  2,646  3,282  0,005
Adjusted  R 2 0,365
INTERCEP  -11,230  18,068  -0,622  0,543
Q17  1,075  3,914  0,275  0,787
Adjusted  R 2 -0,058
49Policy  Research  Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1787  Trading Arrangements  and  Diego Puga  June 1997  J. Ngaine
Industrial Development  Anthony J. Venables  37947
WPS1  788 An Economic Analysis of Woodfuel  Kenneth M. Chomitz  June 1997  A  Maranon
Management in the Sahel: The Case  Charles Griffiths  39074
of Chad
WPS1789  Competition Law in Bulgaria After  Bernard Hoekman  June 1997  J. Ngaine
Central Planning  Simeon Djankov  37947
WPS1790  Interpreting the Coefficient of  Barry R. Chiswick  June 1997  P. Singh
Schooling  in the Human Capital  85631
Earnings Function
WPS1791  Toward Better Regulation of Private  Hemant Shah  June 1997  N. Johl
Pension Funds  38613
WPS1792  Tradeoffs from Hedging: Oil Price  Sudhakar Satyanarayan  June 1997  E. Somensatto
Risk in Ecuador  30128
WPS1793  Wage and Pension Pressure on the  Alain de Crombrugghe  June 1997  M. Jandu
Polish Budget  33103
WPS1794  Ownership Structure, Corporate  Xiaonian Xu  June 1997  J. Chinsen
Governance, and Corporate  Yan Wang  34022
Performance: The Case of Chinese
Stock Companies
WPS1795  What Educational Production  Lant Pritchett  July 1997  S. Fallon
Functions Really Show: A Positive  Deon Filmer  38009
Theory of Education Spending
WPS1796  Cents and Sociability: Household  Deepa Narayan  July 1997  S. Fallon
Income and Social Capital in Rural  Lant Pritchett  38009
Tanzania
WPS1 797 Formal and Informal Regulation  Sheoli Pargal  July 1997  E. de Castro
of Industrial Pollution:  Hemamala Hettige  89121
Comparative Evidence from  Manjula Singh
Indonesia and the United States  David Wheeler
WPS1798  Poor Areas, Or Only Poor People?  Martin Ravallion  July 1997  P. Sader
Quentin Wodon  33902
WPS1799  More for the Poor Is Less for the  Jonath B. Gelbach  July 1997  S. Fallon
Poor: The Politics of Targeting  Lant H. Pritchett  38009
WPS1 800 Single-Equation Estimation of the  John Baffes  August 1997  P. Kokila
Equilibrium  Real Exchange Rate  Ibrahim A. Elbadawi  33716
Stephen A. O'ConnellPolicy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPSI801 Regional  Integration  as Diplomacy  Maurice  Schiff  August 1997  J. Ngaine
L. Alan Winters  37947
WPS1802  Are There Synergies  Between  Harry  Huizinga  August 1997  P. Sintim-Aboagye
World Bank Partial  Credit  38526
Guarantees  and Private  Lending?
WPS1803 Fiscal  Adjustments  in Transition  Barbara  Fakin  August 1997  M. Jandu
Economies:  Social  Transfers  and  the  Alain  de Crombrugghe  33103
Efficiency  of Public  Spending:  A
Comparison  with OECD  Countries
WPS1804 Financial  Sector  Adjustment  Lending: Robert  J. Cull  August 1997  P. Sintim-Aboagye
A Mid-Course  Analysis  37644
WPS1805 Regional  Economic  Integration  and  Junichi Goto  August 1997  G. Ilogon
Agricultural  Trade  33732
WPS1806 An International  Statistical  Survey  Salvatore  Schiavo-Campo August 1997  M. Gueverra
of Government  Employment  and  Giulio  de Tommaso  32959
Wages  Amitabah  Mukherjee
WPS1807 The  Ghosts  of Financing  Gap:  William Easterly  August 1997  K. Labrie
How the Harrod-Domar  Growth  31001
Model  Still Haunts  Development
Economics
WPS1808 Economic  Transition  and  the  Francisco  H. G. Ferreira  August1997  M. Geller
Distributions  of Income  and  Wealth  31393